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Recent bio - research
– Associate Professor at MDH, working on Dependability 
– Dependability modelling and analysis
– ISO 26262-compliant safety case building
– Systematic reuse of (Relaxed) ACID-based transactional artifacts
– Systematic reuse of product-related certification artifacts
– (Safety-critical) Software Development as a Service (SDaaS)
– Systematic reuse of process-related certification artifact
– Research Projects
– EU ECSEL AMASS: Technical manager, WP/Task-leader 
– EU ARTEMIS CHESS, CONCERTO, p/nSafeCer: (co)WP/Task-leader
– SSF SYNOPSIS, Gen&ReuseSafetyCases
– …
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Recent bio - education
– Education
– DVA321-Safety-critical systems engineering
– DVA433-Functional safety, PROMPT initiative
– New course on certification (to be developed) 
– Contribution to the discussion related to the Manifesto on Software 
Process Education, Training and Professionalism
– Constructive Alignment extension for safety critical systems
42017 March 27th, Malaga University
• Certification
– from Latin, certify-->make certain
– in common use: attestation by someone trustworthy that a 
certain statement is true to the best of his/her knowledge
• Why Safety Certification?
“Safety certification assures society at large that deployment of 
a given system does not pose an unacceptable risk of harm. There 
are several ways of organizing and conducting certification, but all 
are conceptually based on scrutiny of an argument that certain 
claims about safety are justified by evidence about the system. “ 
Taken from J. Rushby, Substantially revised version; original appears in Proceedings of the Ninth ACM 
International Conference On Embedded Software (EMSOFT), pp. 211–218, Taipei, Taiwan, October 2011. 
Preliminary concepts
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• What can be certified in the context of safety-critical 
systems?
– Processes
– Products
– Tools used during the development of products
• Tool qualification processes
– …
Preliminary concepts
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• We have no real consensus on absolutely essential metrics for products.
• It is widely accepted that testing software products completely is not
possible. One of the major differences between software products and more
traditional, physical products, is that the principle of continuity does not apply to
software products. Since software engineers felt that even a huge number
of test cases could not guarantee the quality of the product, we turned
to supportive evidence, hoping that layers of evidence will add up
to more tangible proof of quality/dependability.
Why process-based certification?
7
Taken from: A. Wassyng, T. Maibaum, and M. Lawford. 
On Software Certification: We Need Product-Focused Approaches. 
LNCS Vol. 6028, Springer, 2010, 250-274.
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• Processes are not useful
• Documentation is not useful
Self-fulfilling prophecy1
[Parnas et al 1986] A RATIONAL DESIGN PROCESS: HOW AND WHY TO FAKE IT 
1A prediction that directly or indirectly causes itself to become true, by the very 
terms of the prophecy itself, due to positive feedback between belief and behavior
Process and process-based certification
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On the statement: processes are not useful
For process-inspiration, consider: https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Cookbook:Fried_Eggs
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On the statement: processes are not useful
Time wasted! Moreover, in the meantime, I might burn the eggs, 
I might eat cancerogenic substances
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§ Which is the danger?
– “box ticking” mentality (checklist of deliverables)
§ We need product assurance instead of compliance 
with standards. Compliance with standards is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition!
§ Why is not sufficient?
– efﬁcacy of development approaches (UNKNOWN)
– beneﬁts of certiﬁcation schemes (UNKNOWN)
Process-based certification
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“Those seeking to reduce costs argue that some of the DO- 178B objectives or activities are
unnecessary and could be eliminated. The danger is that, if we don’t know why
DO-178B works, we could stop doing something that really matters, which could lead to an
accident.” Taken from D. Daniels “The Efficacy of DO-178B ”
“never-enough-studied process-product relationship”
Taken from M. Fusani & G. Lami “On the efficacy of safety-related software standards”
Planning the Unplanned Experiment: 
Assessing the Efficacy of Standards for Safety Critical Software, EDCC workshop, 2014
Process-based certification
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Certification crisis!!!
Why?
(Increasingly, many researchers and practitioners are questioning themselves about the value of the current certification processes)
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ECEASST
Figure 1: The framework
accommodate all approaches to certification, from current in-use standards based approaches to
our own vision for software certification. In fact, there is no reason that the framework could not
be applied to any setting in which evaluation takes place.
The framework decomposes any certification scheme into four aspects, indicated by the ital-
icized words in the simplified approach above: evidence, confidence, determination and certifi-
cation. The remainder of this section is devoted to discussing each of the aspects in detail. For
each, we give its philosophical basis, explain what it is meant to include and to exclude, give ex-
amples of the kinds of things that it indicates, and provide a (provisional) further decomposition
into useful sub-categories. Figure 1 presents the decomposition in graphical form.
3.1 Evidence
Evidence embodies the empirical part of the certification effort. It consists of the things under
consideration: the real-world objects and documents that form the informational foundation of
evaluation. Examples of evidence specific to the software setting include source code, require-
ments, specifications, machine executables, models, test results, proofs of correctness, real-world
trial results, etc. Evidence can also include things like personnel qualifications/certifications and
documented adherence to development processes.
When we discuss evidence in isolation from the other aspects, we are discussing how to iden-
tify, observe, measure, classify and organize items of interest. We are not talking about their
trustworthiness, accuracy, relevance, adequacy, or any other such interpretation: these issues are
epistemic and therefore fall into the confidence aspect. We are also not talking about the actual
performance of any observations or measurements, as this is a pragmatic consideration which is
5 / 15 Volume 46 (2011)
Certification framework
14
“..designed to allow for new measurements and analyses to be incorporated as they become available, but also to make use of 
more qualitative evidence like process adherence and personnel qualifications, etc., for the time being. “
Taken from: M. Bender, T. Maibaum, M. Lawford and A. Wassyng, "Positioning Verification in the Context of Software/System 
Certification", In Proc. of the 11th International Workshop on Automated Verification of Critical Systems (AVoCS 2011), Electronic 
Communications of the EASST (European Association of Software Science and Technology), Volume 46, 2013. 
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Let’s look at reality…
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Context
• DO-178B ISO 26262-2011 BS EN 50128:2001 
• DO-178C ISO 26262-2018 BS EN 50128:2011 
• …
The original DO-178 had sixty-seven pages. Today’s engineers working on a modern Integrated Modular Avionic (IMA) platform
have to be familiar with (and in many cases comply to) over a thousand pages of official RTCA publications supported by
hundreds of pages of regulatory guidance. The DO-178C family of documents alone weighs in at over six hundred pages.
Taken from “Assuring Avionics – Updating the Approach for the 21st Century ” by T. Ferrell and U. Ferrell, SASSUR, 2014
Objective-based Prescriptive, triple V model
+ tailoring rules
Prescriptive, V model
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IEC 61508
ISO 26262
ASPICE
Proliferation of standards
àthousands of pages!
àincreasing complexity
àintellectual unmanageability
à(re)certification is inefficient
(time consuming and expensive!)
EN 5012x
DO 178B/C
DO 330
DO-326A 
…
Motivation
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How the proliferation of standards could
be faced?
• How complexity could be mastered?
• How can we speed up (re)certification?
• How can we enable intra/cross domain reuse?
• How can we enable process-related systematic reuse?
• What varies from one criticality level to another?
• What varies from one version to another?
• What remains unchanged?
• What can be reused?
• What can be generated?
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• Concurrent engineering of a set of products
– Why? To reuse systematically
• To reduce time and cost, while increasing quality
Product lines engineering
20
P1 P2 P3 P4
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• 2-phase method
Commonalities
- Shape
- …
Variabilities
- Size
- What else?
Product lines engineering
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Product lines engineering
(modelling support)
sizediameter emoticon
small big
football
22
P4={big, emoticon}
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• Concurrent engineering of a set o safety-oriented processes
– Why? To reuse systematically!
• Which consists of:
– Scoping
– Domain engineering (full and partial commonalities, variabilities)
– Process engineering
Safety-oriented process line engineering-SoPLE
23
Gallina et al 2012
(SEW Workshop)
Gallina et al 2014
(QUORS Workshop)
Gallina et al 2014
(DEVVARTS Workshop)
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• S-TunExSPEM (SPEM2.0 extension)
• vSPEM (SPEM2.0 extension)
Tools (company-specific decision): Unified Modeling 
Language (UML) and a model-based development 
environment (e.g., SCADE Suite). 
This design process may vary due to the software 
level, whose variation constrains other variabilities, 
as specified in Annex A in [7]. 
Safety-oriented Process Lines Engineering 
Safety-oriented process lines [1] represent sets of 
safety-oriented processes that may exhibit: full 
commonalities (equal process elements), partial 
commonalities (structured process elements that are 
partially equal), and variabilities. Variabilities denote 
elements that may vary e.g., optional process 
elements or process elements that represent variants 
and can be chosen instead of others at specific 
variation points. The fundamental process elements 
to be interconnected to model processes are: tasks 
(which represent broken down units of work), work 
products (e.g., deliverables), roles, guidance, and 
tools.  
As recalled in [1], safety-oriented process lines can 
be engineered by adopting a three-phase approach 
consisting of a first phase aimed at scoping the 
process line, a second phase aimed at engineering the 
domain (i.e., modeling (partially) common and 
variable process elements) and a third phase aimed at 
engineering the single processes by selecting and 
composing reusable process elements to obtain the 
models related to single processes. To show the 
potential for intra as well as cross-domain reuse, in 
[2], we have engineered an automotive safety-
oriented process line constituted of development 
processes while in [3] we have engineered a cross-
domain safety-oriented process line constituted of 
tool qualification processes. 
Safety-oriented Process Line Modeling  
As we discussed in [1, 2], to model processes, 
various general-purpose languages are at disposal 
e.g., SPEM 2.0 [9]. However, currently, no language 
is available to model safety-oriented process lines. In 
[2], due to the necessity of having a tool at disposal, 
we proposed a methodological approach to model 
safety-oriented process lines in EPF-Composer [10] 
via some workaround solution. 
Recently, two relevant extensions of SPEM 2.0 have 
been proposed: vSPEM [11], to model process lines 
and S-TunExSPEM [12] to model and exchange 
safety-oriented processes (focus on DO-178B/C 
processes). However, no tool support exists for 
modeling by using these extensions. In our context, a 
combination of these two extensions could represent 
an interesting solution. S-TunExSPEM, for instance, 
could be extended with vSPEM constructs. Thus, in 
this subsection, we recall essential information 
related to these extensions. More specifically, with 
respect to S-TunExSPEM, we partially recall its 
safety-tunability, which is supported by the following 
language constructs:  
• Safety-related process elements e.g., SafetyRole, 
SafetyTask, etc. These elements are characterized 
by the presence of a safety hats.  
• An attribute to allow process engineers to set the 
safety level. Only four levels are at disposal since 
in case of negligible (e.g. no effect, level E in 
DO-178B/C) consequences related to the 
hazards, no specific safety-related process 
elements are needed. This attribute is 
syntactically concretized via the colour of the 
safety hat (i.e. red for the most critical safety 
level, followed by orange, yellow and bitter 
lemon). A red hat that decorates a role denotes 
high qualification (i.e., high level of proven 
experience and sufficient seniority to be 
considered competent and accountable for the 
actions the role is responsible for). 
The above language constructs are concretized via 
the icons given in Table 1. Table 1 mainly (except for 
phase) shows the icons that can be used to define 
statically the processes. To define processes 
dynamically, additional icons are available. These 
additional icons are obtained by decorating SPEM2.0 
inUse icons, in a similar way as for Definition icons. 
Table 1. Subset of S-TunExSPEM Icons 
Task  
 
Role 
 
Tool 
 
Work 
product 
Guidance Phase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
With respect to vSPEM, we recall its support for 
variability by focusing on the concrete syntax. As 
Table 2 shows, vSPEM basically introduces the 
possibility to model: 1) variation points, by 
decorating SPEM2.0 icons with empty circles; and 2) 
variants, by decorating SPEM2.0 icons with a V. 
Safety-oriented process lines modeling
Table 2. Subset of vSPEM Icons 
Concept  Variation point  Variant 
 
T sk   
To connect a variant (optional/alternative/etc. 
process element) to a variation point, vSPEM 
provides the occupation relationship arrow, which is 
an arrow having a filled circle on the opposite side. 
Process Compliance 
Safety certification requires the applicant to 
show that the product (e.g., aircraft) behaves 
acceptably safe and that the development process 
meets the objectives. Despite the absence of scientific 
evidence concerning the real efficacy of the 
development processes defined within the standards 
[13, 14 and 15], compliance with those processes is 
required. To be compliant, in general, a company has 
two alternatives. The first alternative consists of the 
strict and almost literal implementation of the 
process. This entails:  
• the identification and assignment of 
roles/responsibilities. 
• the execution of all the activities according a 
specific order (if any) and/or grouping (if any);  
• the consumption/provision of all the required 
work products;   
• the application of specific guidance (if any);  
• the usage of specific tools (if any). 
Each of the above steps has to be performed with the 
stringency required by the software level. 
The second alternative consists of the execution of a 
tailored process obtained by applying tailoring rules 
(e.g. the usage of alternative methods/guidance if 
accepted by assessors) to the prescriptive one. 
In the context of objective-based standards (e.g., DO-
178B/C), processes are not prescriptive. The 
manufacturer has only to show that the objectives 
have been met. 
Process compliance documentation 
To document process compliance, two strategies 
may be adopted: single-process-centered, process-
line centered. To avoid re-inventing the wheel, 
whenever argumentation lines can be identified, the 
process-line centered alternative is preferable. 
To document/argue about process compliance, 
various means are at disposal [16]: textual languages 
(e.g. semi-structured natural language), graphical 
languages (e.g., Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) 
[17], Claim-Argument-Evidence (CAE) [18]), or a 
combination of both. These means are more generally 
used to document safety cases. Recently, an OMG 
standard, called SACM [19], has been provided to 
unify argumentation languages (namely, GSN and 
CAE). GSN is currently the only documentation 
means that offers constructs to argue about 
argumentation lines [4]. Thus, in this subsection, we 
briefly recall its concrete syntax. 
 
Figure 1. GSN Modeling Elements 
The GSN modeling elements can be composed to 
structure the argumentation into flat or hierarchically 
nested graphs (constituted of a set of nodes and a set 
of edges), called goal structures. Of particular interest 
in the context of this paper is the possibility to 
document extrinsic variability i.e., the variability 
within the goal structure due to the variability within 
the process line model. A choice during the 
configuration of a single process, will have an impact 
on the goal structure. The interested reader may refer 
to [4 and 17] for a complete introduction of GSN and 
its extension. 
Model-driven Engineering/Certification 
As we recalled in [5], Model-driven Engineering 
(MDE) is a model-centric software development 
methodology aimed at raising the level of abstraction 
in software specification and increasing automation 
in software development. MDE indeed exploits 
models to capture the software characteristics at 
different abstraction levels. These models are usually 
specified by using (semi) formal domain-specific 
languages. For automation purposes, model 
Gallina et al 2014
(SERA Conference)
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Process compliance
• To be compliant, a company has two alternatives: 
– strict and almost literal implementation of the process
• identification and assignment of roles;
• execution of all the activities according a specific order (if any) and/or 
grouping (if any); 
• consumption/provision of all the required work products;  
• application of specific guidance (if any); 
• usage of specific tools (if any).
– execution of a tailored process
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Process compliance documentation
• Textual languages (plain natural language)
• Graphical notations
– CAE
– GSN
Table 2. Subset of vSPEM Icons 
Concept  Variation point  Variant 
 
Task   
To connect a variant (optional/alternative/etc. 
process element) to a variation point, vSPEM 
provides the occupation relationship arrow, which is 
an arrow having a filled circle on the opposite side. 
Process Compliance 
Safety certification requires the applicant to 
show that the product (e.g., aircraft) behaves 
acceptably safe and that the development process 
meets the objectives. Despite the absence of scientific 
evidence concerning the real efficacy of the 
development processes defined within the standards 
[13, 14 and 15], compliance with those processes is 
required. To be compliant, in general, a company has 
two alternatives. The first alternative consists of the 
strict and almost literal implementation of the 
process. This entails:  
• the identification and assignment of 
roles/responsibilities. 
• the execution of all the activities according a 
specific order (if any) and/or grouping (if any);  
• the consumption/provision of all the required 
work products;   
• the application of specific guidance (if any);  
• the usage of specific tools (if any). 
Each of the above steps has to be performed with the 
stringency required by the software level. 
The second alternative consists of the execution of a 
tailored process obtained by applying tailoring rules 
(e.g. the usage of alternative methods/guidance if 
accepted by assessors) to the prescriptive one. 
In the context of objective-based standards (e.g., DO-
178B/C), processes are not prescriptive. The 
manufacturer has only to show that the objectives 
have been met. 
Process compliance documentation 
To document process compliance, two strategies 
may be adopted: single-process-centered, process-
line centered. To avoid re-inventing the wheel, 
whenever argumentation lines can be identified, the 
process-line centered alternative is preferable. 
To document/argue about process compliance, 
various means are at disposal [16]: textual languages 
(e.g. semi-structured natural language), graphical 
languages (e.g., Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) 
[17], Claim-Argument-Evidence (CAE) [18]), or a 
combination of both. These means are more generally 
used to document safety cases. Recently, an OMG 
standard, called SACM [19], has been provided to 
unify argumentation languages (namely, GSN and 
CAE). GSN is currently the only documentation 
means that offers constructs to argue about 
argumentation lines [4]. Thus, in this subsection, we 
briefly recall its concrete syntax. 
 
Figure 1. GSN Modeling Elements 
The GSN modeling elements can be composed to 
structure the argumentation into flat or hierarchically 
nested graphs (constituted of a set of nodes and a set 
of edges), called goal structures. Of particular interest 
in the context of this paper is the possibility to 
document extrinsic variability i.e., the variability 
within the goal structure due to the variability within 
the process line model. A choice during the 
configuration of a single process, will have an impact 
on the goal structure. The interested reader may refer 
to [4 and 17] for a complete introduction of GSN and 
its extension. 
Model-driven Engineering/Certification 
As we recalled in [5], Model-driven Engineering 
(MDE) is a model-centric software development 
methodology aimed at raising the level of abstraction 
in software specification and increasing automation 
in software development. MDE indeed exploits 
models to capture the software characteristics at 
different abstraction levels. These models are usually 
specified by using (semi) formal domain-specific 
languages. For automation purposes, model 
SACM (Structured Assurance Case Metamodel) 2.0
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Model-driven Engineering
• MDE: Model-centric software engineering method 
– Model transformations from source to target space
• Vertical transformations aimed at generating code
• Horizontal transformation aimed at analyzing properties
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282017 March 27th, Malaga University
SoPL
Process 
compliance
Argumentation
Line
THRUST
+ model-driven principles…
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Gallina et al 2014
(DASC Conference)
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THRUST
• Method for speeding up the creation of process-based 
artefacts via:
– Systematic reuse 
• safety-oriented process lines
• safety argumentation lines
– Semi-automatic generation
• model driven certification
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transformations are used to refine models (model-to- 
model transformations) and finally generate code 
(model-to- code transformations). A model 
transformation (e.g. Model- to-Model) transforms a 
source model (compliant with one meta-model) into a 
target model compliant with the same or a different 
meta-model. A standard transformation can be 
defined as a set of rules to map source to the target. 
Each rule describes how to transform source 
instances to the identical target. Besides vertical 
transformations for software development, horizontal 
transformations can be conceived for other purposes 
(semi-automatic generation of certification artefacts 
in the context of this paper). 
THRUST 
In this section we present our proposal, called 
THRUST. THRUST is a method that allows users to 
speed up the creation of process-related deliverables 
by combining safety-oriented process line 
engineering, process-based argumentation line 
engineering and model driven certification. Figure 2 
provides and overview of THRUST given by using 
S-TunExSPEM. As Figure 2 shows, THRUST 
consists of four phases: two process-centered phases 
and two process-based argumentation-centered 
phases. The red hat is meant to highlight that 
THRUST is highly critical. THRUST is expected to 
provide support for efficient creation and 
management of process-related deliverables 
compliant with the most stringent development 
assurance level, A, of DO-178B/C. 
 
Figure 2. THRUST Overview 
As Figure 3 shows, these phases can be partially 
ordered logically. Various executions are possible 
since concurrent phases can be serialized in various 
ways. At the end, however, the deliverables of both 
branches (left and right) have to be available to 
satisfy the certification authorithies.  
 
Figure 3. THRUST-high-level Activity Diagram 
Process-centered phases 
In this subsection, we focus on the left-hand 
branch of the activity diagram, shown in Figure 3, 
and we reveal the tasks that are embraced by the 
phases. As Figure 4 shows, the Domain (Process-
elements) Engineering phase consists of three tasks, 
which can be iterated if needed. The first task 
consists of the interpretation of the set of standards 
according to S-TunExSPEM i.e., identification of 
tasks, safety tasks, etc. Then, common and variable 
process elements are identified. Finally the process 
line is modeled by using S-TunExSPEM extension. 
 
Figure 4. Focus on the Process-related Phases 
Once the safety-oriented process line model is at 
disposal, single processes can be derived from it by 
selecting and composing the required process 
elements. This derivation is performed during the 
Process Engineering Phase. 
THRUST
MDSafeCer
(Gallina 2014, ASSURE Workshop)
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THRUST
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III. GENERATION AND REUSE OF PROCESS-BASED
ARGUMENTS
In the context of safety certification, it is required to collect
and structure the evidence that a system is acceptably safe.
Generally, this requires the provision of process as well as
product-based arguments. A safety case should be constituted
of two branches (one devoted to process-based argumentation
and the other to product-based argumentation). These branches
could be developed in parallel and be inter-related. In some
safety standards, these branches can be provided separately.
As recalled in the introduction, within ISO 26262, the process-
based argumentation is provided separately to be evaluated
and documented within the Safety Functional Audit work-
product. In this section, we focus on the process-based branch
and we present a method to generate and reuse process-
based arguments. In particular, in Section III-A we give an
overview of our model-driven safety certification method. In
Section III-A, we provide the conceptual mapping between
SPEM 2.0 and ARM/SACM. Then, in Section III-C, we sketch
in natural language the meaningful steps of the algorithm that
should be executed to automatically generate process-based
arguments from process models.
A. Model-driven Safety Certification
To generate certification artifacts, we propose to use MDE
principles and apply them in the context of certification.
The idea is to pioneer a Model-Driven Safety Certification
(MDSafeCer) method enabling automatic generation of argu-
mentation models from process models. The goal is not the
creation of novel goal structures, but the generation of goal
structure that have successful stories and a proven compelling
power. Thus, reuse of experience is crucial to provide adequate
transformation rules allowing for the generation of easy-to-
maintain and easy-to-review arguments.
Fig. 2. MDSafeCer overview specified in SPEM 2.0.
Fig. 3. Safety process modeling.
As Fig. 2 shows, MDSafeCer is constituted of three chained
iterative tasks. The first task, called “Safety process modeling”
is detailed in Fig. 3. This first task shows that a process
engineer is responsible of modeling a safety process according
to the best practices in process modeling as well as according
to the standard(s). To model a process, a modeling tool is used.
As shown in Fig. 4, once the model is available the process
engineer generates a process-based argument by using a model
transformation implemented within a transformation engine.
As shown in Fig. 5, this argument, which can be considered
a “raw” or better defeasible [14] argument, is then checked
and eventually corrected (if fallacies are detected) and/or
completed by a safety argumentation expert. Checking and
completion is an iterative task, which takes in input also the
feedback provided by external assessors. If the transformation
engine or the safety argumentation expert detect problems re-
lated to the process-based argument due to e.g. missing/wrong
information in the process model, new iterations of the first
task are required.
Fig. 4. Process-based argument generation.
Fig. 5. Process-based argument Check&Completion.
To perform the generation of the process-based argument
via model transformation, no constraint on the source and
target meta-models exists. However, by considering the current
state of the art in terms of standardization, tool-support and
active research community, we choose SPEM 2.0 for the source
space and ARM/SACM for the target space. Fig. 6 shows the
M2M intended transformation. In case of more appropriate
future alternatives, our general approach remains valid. As
recalled in Section II, both SPEM 2.0 and ARM/SACM are two
domain-specific meta-models and in the context of this paper
they represent a possibility towards the realization of our MD-
SafeCer method, allowing for the generation of ARM/SACM-
compliant argumentation models from SPEM 2.0-compliant
process models.
Fig. 6. M2M tranformation.
As we discussed in [15] and as it was mentioned in [16],
the goal of automation is not to replace human reasoning, but
to focus it on areas where they are best used. Similarly, in
this work we are not aiming at eliminating human reasoning
MDSafeCer
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(ASSURE Workshop)
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• Concerning process compliance, in ISO 26262 we can read:
– The organization shall institute, execute and maintain organization-specific 
rules and processes to comply with the requirements of ISO 26262 (Part 2, 5.4.2.2).
– Organization-specific rules and processes for functional safety is a specific 
work-product that must be provided (Part 2, 5.5.1).
– A functional safety audit shall be carried out for items, where the highest 
ASIL of the item’s safety goals is ASIL (B), C, or D, in accordance with 6.4.7, 
6.4.3.5 i) and 6.4.8.2. (Part 2, 6.4.8.1), where a functional safety audit is a work-
product aimed at evaluating the process implementation.
– The organization may tailor the safety lifecycle (Part 2, 5.4.5.1) and tailoring 
rules are then detailed.
Thus, for certification purposes, it is crucial to provide work-products aimed at 
showing that either process activities have been performed according to the ISO 
26262 safety life-cycle or they have been tailored appropriately according to the 
tailoring rules provided within ISO 26262.
Applying MDSafeCer - ISO 26262
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in compliance with ISO 26262. In particular, we consider the
task Hazard identification, part of the Hazard analysis and risk
assessment clause. Then, we apply the generation rules given
in Section III and we obtain the corresponding process-based
argumentation in GSN. The rules are performed manually but
this task is expected to be tool-supported. Then, we play the
role of the safety manager and we evaluate the quality of the
generation.
A. Process Task Modelling
Fig. 7 shows how the task Hazards identification can be
modeled in SPEM 2.0.
Fig. 7. Hazards identification in SPEM 2.0.
To the task “Hazard identification” (also names ta1) the
following process elements are associated: a role (the responsi-
ble for hazards identification also named ro1), a work-product
(Filled-in FMEA template also named wp1), a guidance (work-
sheet and guidelines for Failure Mode and Effects Analysis,
known as FMEA template, also named gu1), and a tool (FMEA
software packages, also named to1).
B. Process-based Sub-argument Provision
Fig. 8. Hazards identification in GSN.
On the basis of the information contained in the model
(shown in Fig. 7) related to the task “Hazards identification”,
by applying the rules given in Section III-C, the sub-goal-
structure presented in Fig. 8 can be obtained. This task is
required for all ASIL and also in other standards. As discussed
in [4], prescriptive processes are mandated by various stan-
dards and the “Hazards identification” task can be considered
a cross-domain commonality. The potential reusability of the
process-based arguments is supported by a recent work [18],
which shows by modeling an automotive process line that in
automotive standards common process elements are present.
Thus, reuse in terms of process elements and process-based
certification artefacts is a concrete possibility.
C. Process-based Sub-argument Evaluation and Completion
A safety argumentation expert at a first glance may be
disappointed in front of this initial result. The fragment ob-
tained via transformation rules, however, represents an in-
teresting starting point. The rules permit the generation of
fragments which contain the essential elements for process
compliance. For sake of simplicity and space reasons, the rules
are not particularly detailed and do not handle exceptions yet
(e.g. missing information in the process model from which
default GSN elements could be proposed). Thus, a safety
argumentation expert could propose to introduce additional
GSN modeling elements to: 1) denote parts that should be
developed (e.g., by adding Undeveloped goals [10]) and 2)
strengthen the confidence of the argument (e.g., by adding
Justification [10], Assumption [10]).
Moreover, from a structuring point of view, the expert
could suggest to improve the generation towards contract-
based and modular structuring methods. Assuming for instance
that tasks can be performed by different teams working in
different departments, a contract-based approach would make
sense since it would emphasize the contractual nature of the
application of the development process. Contracts [10] could
be added to join and organize the different process-based
argumentation fragments generated by different teams. Further-
more, the evidence concerning the certification/qualification of
the tool could be represented via a different modeling element
(i.e., an AwaySolution [10]) to state that this evidence is
provided elsewhere as a result of the tool qualification process
(ISO 26262, Part 8.11). To ensure flexibility, various structures
could be provided and offered as alternatives to satisfy different
argumentation styles.
V. RELATED WORK
To ensure compliance as well as reduce time and cost, dif-
ferent solutions (compliance checking, reuse, automatic gener-
ation, etc.) are being investigated under different perspectives,
mainly product-based perspectives. Exceptions to this product-
based focus are the contributions presented in [19]. In [19],
authors propose a workflow-based approach to provide: 1)
reference models for the safety processes mandated by the
standards and 2) automatic compliance checking capabilities
of user-defined processes against reference models. As we
discussed in [15], generating safety case arguments to increase
efficiency of safety certification is becoming a hot research
topic. A method for generating such arguments based on an au-
tomatic extraction of information from existing work-products
is presented in [20]. The generated arguments consist of
summaries of different work products created within a project.
Similarly, a method for safety case assembly from process
artefacts is presented in [21]. None of these methods, however,
introduces a clear model-driven method. Meta-modeling in the
context of safety cases is a rather recent research topic and thus
the development of model-driven methods has beed delayed
due to the absence of standardized, stable and fully formalized
meta-models. More recently, in [22], [23], we provided an
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(e.g. missing information in the process model from which
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that tasks can be performed by different teams working in
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sense since it would emphasize the contractual nature of the
application of the development process. Contracts [10] could
be added to join and organize the different process-based
argumentation fragments generated by different teams. Further-
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(i.e., an AwaySolution [10]) to state that this evidence is
provided elsewhere as a result of the tool qualification process
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could be provided and offered as alternatives to satisfy different
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To ensure compliance as well as reduce time and cost, dif-
ferent solutions (compliance checking, reuse, automatic gener-
ation, etc.) are being investigated under different perspectives,
mainly product-based perspectives. Exceptions to this product-
based focus are the contributions presented in [19]. In [19],
authors propose a workflow-based approach to provide: 1)
reference models for the safety processes mandated by the
standards and 2) automatic compliance checking capabilities
of user-defined processes against reference models. As we
discussed in [15], generating safety case arguments to increase
efficiency of safety certification is becoming a hot research
topic. A method for generating such arguments based on an au-
tomatic extraction of information from existing work-products
is presented in [20]. The generated arguments consist of
summaries of different work products created within a project.
Similarly, a method for safety case assembly from process
artefacts is presented in [21]. None of these methods, however,
introduces a clear model-driven method. Meta-modeling in the
context of safety cases is a rather recent research topic and thus
the development of model-driven methods has beed delayed
due to the absence of standardized, stable and fully formalized
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Contracts?
Modules?
Justifications?
Assumptions?
Undeveloped goals?
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Proof-of-concept prototype
• Implementation within AIT-WEFACT-tool
Work in cooperation with:
Austrian Institute of Technology (AIT)
Virtual Vehicle Research Center (ViF)
http://www.ait.ac.at/research-services/research-services-digital-safety-
security/verification-and-validation/methods-and-tools/wefact-workflow-
engine-for-analysis-certification-and-test/?L=1
• Implementation within the SDaaS-prototype architecture
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Take home message
• SoPLE+MDSafeCer may contribute in increasing efficiency
• More efficiency in process certificationà
More time for product-based evidence provision!!
àe.g., verification results
• SoPLE may contribute in:
– Re-establishing a balance between the “odd couple” (discipline and creativity) 
– Enabling a transition “from rigid compliance to smart convergence”
– Enabling a transition from non rationalized standards to rationalized standards
R. Conradi & A. Fuggetta. Improving Software Process Improvement. IEEE Software, 2002.
A. Fuggetta & E. Di Nitto. Software process. In Proc. of Future of Software Engineering (FOSE), 2014.
J. C. Knight, J. C. Rowanhill. The Indispensable Role of Rationale in Safety Standards. SAFECOMP, 2016.
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Conclusion
• THRUST/MDSafeCer:
– Novel model-driven approaches for time and cost reduction 
• Mapping of (ideally reusable) process structures (patterns) onto (ideally 
reusable) argumentation structures (patterns) 
• Manual application on various small-sized sub-processes
– Automotive
– Rail
– Avionics
– Space
• Prototype tool support – proof of concepts
– Initial validation
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Future work
• Provision of a fully defined pattern for process compliance
• Contribution to provision of adequate metamodels
• Experimental validation on more complex case-studies
• Towards Anti-Sisyphus: combination of
– safety-oriented process lines, 
– safety-critical product lines, 
– safety case lines
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Process is ”safe/compliant”
(process-based argument)
Product is acceptably safe
(product-based argument)
System X 
is acceptably safe Context of 
system X 
Fragment of a goal structure, safety argument given in GSN (Goal Structuring Notation)
Evaluated via a safety audit
Safety case 
(core arguments)
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Anti-Sisyphus
!
Then, proposed at the brokerage event at MDH, 
http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/es_brokerage/presentations/11_ES_brokerage_Anti-Sisyphus_Barbara_Gallina.pdf
Then, integrated within AMASS (http://www.amass-ecsel.eu), see AMASS newsletter 1.
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Thank you for your attention!
Discussion time…
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